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1. INTRODUCTION
We consider the social relationships between autonomous
principals, assuming that each principal is represented in a
computational multiagent system via a unique agent. Work
on commitment protocols [1, 7] has shown that the mean-
ing of interactions may be expressed in terms of (social)
commitments [3]: Cp(x, y, p, q) represents an expectation of
y (creditor) that x (the debtor) will bring about q (conse-
quent) if p (the antecedent) holds.
Further, we consider a decentralized setting where only
the local states of the participating principals are available.
Each local state reflects what the corresponding principal
has observed, and carries the intuition of being a local pro-
jection of a notional global state. This raises the question
of alignment: given that each agent is confined to its local
view, but the commitments are interagent artifacts, how can
we ensure that the agents remain in a coherent social state?
For instance, when delivery relies on a courier, it will not be
directly observable by the shopkeeper. The commitment to
the delivery of the goods to the client, taken by the shop-
keeper, is satisfied when the courier completes delivery. The
client will see such a commitment as satisfied. Absurdly, the
shopkeeper, who is not situated to observe this event, will
not be able to do so.
In human society, the problem is tackled by relying on
the concerned parties making suitable claims to one another.
We enhance social states in a way that is inspired by such
human mechanisms. We adopt the distinction between prac-
tical and dialectical commitments [5]. The latter are tradi-
tionally used in dialog theory to record the positions taken
by the interlocutors. Instead, we adopt a conception that
introduces an indirection from objective reality to a com-
mitment by an agent about the reality, Cd(x, y, r, p) being
a claim from x to y about p. We adopt the commitments
life-cycle from [6]. Practical and dialectical commitments
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can show subtle linkages. Some philosophers recognized, on
the one hand, the importance of declarations in influencing
behavior, and on the other hand, that the authority of ob-
servations derives from rules of use that reflect tendencies
(dispositions) attributed in specific social settings.
We formalize the social state of an interaction as the set
of the social relationships holding in an interaction context,
which we consider as a set of principals together with the
interactive actions by which they create and manipulate so-
cial relationships. Our work tackles how to progress the
social state of a context when some events that are relevant
to some practical commitments are not observable in the
context. To this end: (1) we use dialectical commitments as
claims concerning the occurrence of events in other contexts;
(2) we define pragmatic rules that the agents of a context
may share: such rules exploit the normative value of dialec-
tical commitments and enable the progress of commitments
to non-observable events.
2. SOCIAL CONTEXTS
We enhance the formalization in [2] to incorporate di-
alectical commitments. We express dialectical commitments
on temporal expressions in precedence logic [4]. A principal
refers to an active social entity such as a person. An event is
either a basic (physical) event, its complement, or an opera-
tion on a dialectical or practical commitment. Below, let P
be a nonempty, finite set of principals. Let B be a nonempty
set of events. Let E be event temporal expressions generated
from B. Let C = {C(x, y, r, u) : x, y ∈ P and r, u ∈ E}, be
the set of possible commitments. Let S be the set of possi-
ble operations on commitments. Let A = E ∪ S be a set of
events. A (social) context relates principals with the events
they generate in that context.
Definition 1. A context is a tuple X = 〈α,C〉 where α
is a partial function α : P 7→ 2A that associates a principal
with a set of events and C ⊆ C is a set of commitments (over
P and E). A principal p ∈ P acts in a context α iff α(p) 6= ∅.
An event a ∈ A arises in a context X iff (∃p ∈ P : a ∈ α(p)).
A context is nonempty when α 6= ∅ and C 6= ∅.
C is the set of the commitment specifications for the con-
text. An action e ∈ E is relevant to a commitment C(x, y,
r, u) ∈ C iff one of the following holds: r/e 6≡ r, r/e 6≡ r,
u/e 6≡ u, or , u/e 6≡ u. In words, e is relevant to C(x, y, r,
u) when e is involved either in r or u. So, e is significant in
the expiration, violation, discharge, detachment, or progres-
sion of the commitment. A context X is closed iff for every
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commitment c ∈ C every event a ∈ A that is relevant to c
arises in X. A context that is not closed is open.
Let X = 〈α,C〉 be a context. For an event a ∈ A, the
observers of a inX, obs(a) ⊆ P, is a set of principals who can
observe the occurrence a. Events that amount to operations
on commitments are always observed by all principals. A
context X is social iff for every a ∈ A, that arises in the
context, obs(a) ⊇ P.
Let X = 〈α,C〉 be a social context. Let τ be a run where,
for each event ak, either ak arises in X or there is a com-
mitment c ∈ C such that ak is relevant to c, and let p ∈ P
be a principal of the context. Let τ |p be the run obtained
from τ by considering only those ak such that p ∈ obs(ak).
Then, the projection pi(τ, i, p) is the set {c ∈ C : τ |p |=i c}.
Proposition 1 (Alignment for Closed Contexts).
Let X be a closed social context. Let τ be a run. For any pair
of principals p′, p′′ ∈ P and index k, pi(τ, p′, k) ≡ pi(τ, p′′, k).
Proposition 1 does not generally hold in open contexts.
We now show how dialectical commitments can be used to
provide testimonies about relevant events that are not ob-
servable within an open context.
Definition 2 (Context closed under claim). A so-
cial context X = 〈α,C〉 is said to be closed under claim
when for every practical commitment c ∈ C, for every event
a ∈ A that is relevant to c but which does not arise in X,
there is an event create(Cd(x, Y, a)) ∈ A, that arises in X,
where x ∈ P, x ∈ obs(a), and Y ⊆ P.
Clearly, all closed contexts are also closed under claim.
Given an open context X = 〈α,C〉, Algorithm 1 will create
a social context that is an extension of it, and that is closed
under claim. Notice that when commitments involve some
Algorithm 1 Closure under Claim of an Open Context
Require: X = 〈α,C〉 is a social context
Require: A′ is the set of events that do not arise in X, and each
of which is relevant to some practical commitment c ∈ C
Require: for any a′ ∈ A′, there is at least one p ∈ P such that
p ∈ obs(a′)
1: function closure(X = 〈α,C〉, A′)
2: α′ ← α; C′ ← C
3: for all a′ ∈ A′ do
4: x← one of p ∈ P, such that p ∈ obs(a′)
5: Y ← P − obs(a′)
6: α′(p)← α′(p) ∪ {create(Cd(x, Y, a′))}
7: C′ ← C′ ∪ {Cd(x, Y, a′)}
8: end for
9: X′ ← 〈α′, C′〉
10: return X′
11: end function
event that cannot be observed by any of the principals, the
context should be extended by including further principals
who can observe the events at issue.
Pragmatic rules are patterns of pragmatic reasoning that
a social context may or may not adopt. We define a prag-
matic rule (Social Recognition of a claim) to enable to con-
sider dialectical commitments to events as sufficient claims
that can be used to progress commitments:
Cd(w, z, t)
Cp(x, y, r, q) −→ Cp(x, y, r/t, q/t) SR
The intent is detaching or discharging practical commit-
ments based upon the creation of appropriate dialectical
commitments; raising the violation or expiration of practical
commitments in presence of appropriate dialectical commit-
ments. The dialectical commitment bridges between two
contexts: the one in which the event occurred and the one
in which it is socially relevant but where it does not arise.
In order to exploit the pragmatic rule SR, we require that:
τ |=i Cd(w, z, t) ∧ τ |=i Cp(x, y, r, u)⇒
τ |=i+1 Cp(x, y, r/t, u/t)
(1)
Proposition 2 (Alignment under Claim).
Given an open social context X = 〈α,C〉, such that for any
relevant event that does not arise in X, at least one of the
principals in X observes it: (1) Let X ′ = 〈α′, C′〉 be the
context closed under claim, that is produced by applying Al-
gorithm 1 to X; (2) Let τ be a run where each event ak
either arises in X or there is a commitment c ∈ C such that
ak is relevant to c; (3) Let τ
′ be the run, that is obtained
by substituting to each ak in τ , that is relevant to a com-
mitment but that does not arise in X, the creation of the
corresponding dialectical commitment, taken from X ′. For
any pair of principals p′, p′′ ∈ P ′, and for each index i, we
have that pi(τ ′, p′, i) ≡ pi(τ ′, p′′, i).
Theorem 1 shows that practical commitments still progress
when adopting SR and considering dialectical commitments
as evidence. The proof is simple by construction.
Theorem 1. Given a social context X = 〈α,C〉 that is
closed under claim, and assuming requirement (1), if τ |=i
C(x, y, r, u) and τi = e, then
τ |=i+1Expire(C(x, y, r/e, u/e)) if r/e .= 0
V iolate(C(x, y, r/e, u/e)) if r/e
.
= >, u/e .= 0
Discharge(C(x, y, r/e, u/e)) if u/e
.
= >
C(x, y, r/e, u/e) otherwise
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